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The Failure of Ricardian Equivalence Under Progressive Wealth Taxation
ABSTRACT
Although the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem holds under a linear estate tax schedule, it fails to
hold under a nonlinear estate tax schedule. In a representative consumereconomy, a temporary
lump—sum tax increase reduces contemporaneous consumption. If different consumers face different
marginal estate tax rates because they leave bequests of different sizes, a lump—sum tax increase
redistributes resources from consumers in low marginal estate tax brackets to consumers in high
marginal estate tax brackets; aggregate consumption mey rise, , or remain unchanged. These
departures from Ricerdian Equivalence hold more generally under any nonlinear tax on saving,
wealth or income accruing to wealth.
Andrew B. Abel
Department of Economics
Littauer 111
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
In a path—breaking paper, Robert Barro (1974) showed that if intergenerational altruism
motivates consumers to leave bequests, then changes in the timing of lum-sum taxes are irrelevant
for the consumption decisions of individual consumers. The k' insight in this demonstration of the
Ricardian Equivalence Theorem is that if consumers derive utility from the utility of their heirs,
as well as from their own consumption, then each (finitely—lived) consumer in an infinitely—lived
family faces an infinite horizon problem when making his consumption and bequest decisions.
Therefore, any change in the path of lump—sum taxes which leaves the present value of taxes
unchanged does not affect the infinite—horizon intertemporal budget constraint and hence does not
affect the optimal path of consumption.
Barro (1 g74) examined the effects of changes in the timing of lump—sum taxes in thepresence
of proportional inheritance taxes and concluded that "the existence of taxes on intergenerational
transfers makes less likely an interior solution for the transfers, but if these transfers are
operative, even if at reduced levels, the marginal effect of [changes in the timing of lump sum
taxes) on consumption plans— —and, hence, on r—— remains nil." (p. 1 109) I will show below that
this conclusion is incorrect, unless, as in Barro's formal analysis, the inheritance tax is a linear
tax. However, most developed economies have a progressive tax on bequests, and the Ricardian
Equivalence Theorem fails to hold in the presence of a nonlinear tax on bequests. Indeed, the
presence of a nonlinear tax on any form of wealth, whether it is an intergenerational transfer or an
individual's life—cycle saving, will lead to a violation of Ricac'dian Equivalence.
The literature on the aggregate implications of bequests contains models which displaymany
important characteristics such as the endogeneity of the rate of return on savings (Buiter[ 1 979],
Carmichael [1982], Burbidge[ 1983), Abel [1 985b]), the non—negativity constraint on bequests
(Well [1 9841) end the uncertainty of the date of death (Abel 11 985a,b]); virtually all models in
this literature include the overlapping nature of generations. Although each of these features of the
economy has important implications which merit study, the model presented below will ignore all
of them. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate clearly, in as simple a model as possible, that a
2nonlinear tax on inheritances, bequests, wealth or property income destrnys the Ricardian
Equivalence result. Furthermore, in a representative consumer framework, the direction of the
departure from Ricardien Equivalence is unambiguous: with increasing marginal tax rates on
inheritances, bequests, wealth or property income, a temporary tax increases reduces
contemporaneous consumption.
The consumer's decision problem is presented in section I and the government budget constraint
is presented in section II. Section III demonstrates that in a representative consumer economy with
increasing marginal estate tax rates, an increase in the lump sum tax leads to a reduction in
aggregate consumption. This effect arises because individual consumers are driven into lower
marginal estate tax brackets and thus face a decrease in the price of their heirs' consumption
relative to their own consumption. This relative price change leads to a decrease in current
consumption. Section IV presents a second channel for the violation of Ricardian Equivalence: the
cross—sectional variation in wealth implies that different consumers leave bequests of different
sizes and hence face different marginal estate tax rates. An increase in the current lump—sum tax
redistributes resources away from consumers in low marginal estate tax brackets to consumers in
high marginal estate tax brackets; the effects on aggregate consumption are discussed in section IV.
Section V then argues that violation of Ricardian Equivalence arises more generally under any
nonlinear tax on wealth or capital income. However, a nonlinear tax on labor income does not
necessarily destroy Ricardian Equivalence as demonstrated in section VI. Concluding remarks are
presented in section VII.
I. The Consumption Decision
Consider an economy which lasts for only two periods——denoted as periods I and 2. Individual
consumers live for only one period. Each consumer who lives in period I has one child and this
child is the consumer's only heir. Each consumer who lives during period i (1 = 1 , 2) receives an
endowment 81, pays a lump—sum tax T, and consumes c1. Period 1 consumers obtain utility from
the utility of their heirs as well as directly from their own consumption. We specify the utility
3function of period 1 consumers to have the additivelyseparable form
u(c1) + 13u(c2) (1)
where u(c1) is the utility that a consumer in period i obtains from
consumption in period i, and 13
is a discount factor that a period 1 consumer 8pplies to the utility of his heir.
Let B denote the bequest left by a representative period 1 consumer so that
B = e1-T1-c1 (2)
Let R be the gross rate of return on assets( bequests). Forsimplicity, R is fixed exogenously. Let
I denote the inheritance received by a period 2 consumer. Suppose that an estate tax t( B) is levied
on the bequest B and that the marginal tax rate is non—negative, less thanone, and is
non—decreasing in B (that is, 0  t < 1 andt"  0). The inheritance received by the period 2
consumer is I = R[B—t(B)]. Because the period 2 consumer has no heirs, heconsumes all of his
available resources so that
c2 = R[B—t(B)J + e2 — 12
A period 1 consumer maximizes the utility function in (1)subject to the budget constraint
obtained by substituting (2) into (3). The first—order condition for thismaximization problem is
u(c1) = BRu(c2)(1—t(B)) (4)
The consumer equates the utility from consuming an extra unit in period I with the utility from
bequeathing an extra unit, thereby increasing his heirs consumption by (1 —t')R units.
11. The Government Budget Constraint
The Ricardian Equivalence Theorem is based on the fact that individual consumers recognize that
the governments intertemporel budget constraint implies that en" r'hanqe in current taxes must be
offset, in present value, by a change in future taxes. 1 If there are initially no government bonds
outstanding, then the governmenVs intertemporal budget constraint can be writtenas
RET1 + t(B)J + 12 = 0 (5)
4Totally differentiating (5) with respect toT1 , 12, and B yields
R[dT1 + V(B)dB] + dT2 = 0 (6)
In the next section we analyze the effect on consumption of changes in the lump—sum taxes T1 end
12 which satisfy (6).
III. The Effect on Consumption of a Change in Lump—Sum Taxes
To calculate the effect of a lump—sum tax change on consumption, first observe from (2) that
dc1 + (lB = —dT1 (7)
Thus either c1 or B (or both) must fall in response to an increase in the lump—sum tax T. Next,
observe from (3) that
dC2 = R[dB—t(B)dBl-dT2 (8)
Substituting the government budget constraint (6) into (8), and using (7), yields
= -Rdc1 (9)
An individual consumer can, 8t the margin, increase c2 and reduce c1 in the ratio ( 1—t'(B))R;
however, in comparing the new equilibrium with the initial equilibrium,c1 and c2 change in the
ratio R, which is the intertemporal price of c2 relative to c1 for the economy as a whole.2
To calculate the changes in c1 and c2, define 0(c) = —u"(c)/u(c)> 0. Logarithmically
differentiating both sides of the first—order condition (4) yields
= z(c2)dc2 + [t"/(1—t(B))JdB (10)
Using (7) to substitue for dB and (9) to substitute for dc2, equation (10) can be written as
— 1 < dc1 /dT = —t"/ {( 1 —t)[o(c1) + Ro(c2)] + t'}  0 (11)
wherethe inequalitiesin( 1 1)followfrom 0 t < 1, t" Oand z(c) >0. Itfollowsfrom (11)
that if the estate tax is linear (t°=0), then Ricardian Equivalence holds. However, if the estate tax
is characterized by a rising marginal rate, then an increase in the first—period lump—sum tax leads
to a decrease in first—period consumption. The direction of the effect of the first—period tax on
first—period consumption is the seine as would be predicted by a naive application of a "Keynesian"
5consumption function relating consumption to contemporaneous disposable income.
The intuition behind the failure of Ricardian Equivalence is straightforward. If Ricardian
Equivalence were to hold so that c1 and c2 were invariant to the change in T, then an increase in
I would reduce the bequest B and hence would reduce the marginal tax rate U, if t " > 0. The effect
of the decrease in V is to increase the utility associated with decreasingc1 by one unit and
increasing c2 by (1 —V )R units. Put differently, the effect of the decrease in V is to reduce the
price of the heir's consumption relative to the consumer's own consumption. Hence, the consumer
responds to this intertemporal price change by reducing c1 and increasing C2.
The reduction in c1 is smaller than the increase in T.. To understand this result,suppose that
the reduction in c1 were equal to the increase in T. In this case, the bequest B would beunchanged
end the intergenerational terms of trade (1 —t')R would be unchanged. But if the intergenerational
terms of trade are unchanged, and lithe present value of taxes is unchanged, then theoptimal
response of c1 to the change in I is zero rather one—for—one.
The results implied by equation (11) are derived under the assumption that the estate tax isa
twIce differentiable function of the bequest. owev, actual tax codes generally specifymarginal
tax rates (U) as step functions of the tax base. Thus, at any given tax base, the slope of the
marginal tax function Ct") is either zero or' is undefined. Therefore, a literal interpretation of
(11) may lead one to conclude (incorrectly) that the nonlinearity in actual tax codes does not
destroy Ricardian Equivalence. However, Ricerdian Equivalence will fail to hold if, by maintaining
current consumption unchanged, the representative consumer is driven into a lower (marginal)
tax brdcket by the lump—sum tax increase. The greeter is the increase in the first—periodtax, the
greeter is the likelihood that the representative consumer will be driven into a lower marginal tax
bracket.
IV. Cross—Sectional Variation in Initial Wealth
With a nonlinear estate tax schedule, there are two sources of variation in marginal tax rates
6which can destrny the irrelevance of lump—sum tax changes. In section III we focussed on the
variation in the marginal estate tax rate faced by an individual consumer as the lump—sum taxes
are Varied. Any change in the marginal estate tax rate faced by a consumer implies a change in the
intergenerational terms of trade and thus causes a change in the intergenerational allocation of
consumption. Alternatively, in this section we consider the cross—sectional variation in marginal
estate tax rates which arises because otherwise identical first—period consumers have different
levels of initial wealth or endowments. The presence of cross—sectional variation in marginal
estate tax rates implies that a non—discriminatory increase in the first—period lump—sum tax, T,
induces a redistribution of wealth from families with low marginal tax rates to families with high
marginal tax rates. This redistribution arises because the tax T generates a deduction from the
taxable estate. The size of the reduction in estate taxes generated by a given increase in T1 is an
increasing function of the marginal estate tax rate so that en intertemporally balanced—budget
lump-sum increase in T shifts resources towards families with high marginal estate tax rates.
To keep the analysis simple, we assume that the marginal tax rate schedule is a step function of
the size of the bequest. Furthermore, we assume that the bequest left by each consumer is
sufficiently far from the next tax bracket, and that the change in the lump—sum tax is sufficiently
small, so that no consumers are driven into different tax brackets as a result of the tax change.
Formally, these assumptions imply that for the relevant values of the bequests, t"=O.
Suppose that all first—period consumers are identical in all respects except for the initial
endowment e1. Suppose that there are J possible values of the first—period endowmentej , 4 =
I ,... ,J. We will refer to a consumer who receives an endowmentSi 1 as a type 4 consumer. Let Si
denote the fraction of first—period consumers who are of type j, so that Z Si = 1. Equation (10) in
section III holds for each type of consumer. Setting t" = 0, dividing (10) by z(c42) and using (7)
and (8) to substitute for dc2 yields
[(cj1)/z(c2) + RJdc1 = — {R[dT1 +t'(B1)dB] + dT2} (12)
where the subscript 4 denotes that a variable pertains to a type 4 consumer. Note that the
7lump—sum taxes T. and 12 are not subscripted by j because we areconfining our attention to
lump—sum tax policies which do not discriminate across consumers of different types.
The governments budget constraint in (5) must be modified to take account of the different
estate tax payments by different types of consumers
RET1 + jsjt(B)I + 12 = 0 (13)
Totally differentiating the government budget constraint (1 3) with respect toT , 12, and Bj ,and
using the fact that X sj = 1, yields
Z S {R E + t'(Bj )dBj I + dT2) = 0 (14)
Let dC1 = Z Sj thj 1 be the change in aggregate first—period consumption. It follows
immediately from (12) that
= — (R[dT1 + t'(B3)dBjl + 2} [(cj)/z(cj2) RI (15)
If g(c) is constant, then it follows from (15) and the government budget constraint (14) that
dC1 = 0. Although aggregate consumption is unchanged when z( c) is constant, the Ricardian
Equivalence Theorem does not hold because an increase in 1 and the associated reductionin 12
redistribute resources from families with low marginal estate tax rates to families with high
marginal estate tax rates. Therefore, consumers with high marginal tax rates increase their
consumption and consumers with low marginal tax rates decrease their consumption.
In general, aggregate first—period consumption changes in response to a change in lump-sum
taxes which obeys the government budget constraint. Since the coefficientof dcj 1 on the left hand
side of (12) is positive, the sign of the right hand side of (12) is thesame as the sign of dcj i.
Substituting (7) into (12) we obtain
[Z(Cjl)/z(cj2) + (1—tf)R] = — (R(1—t)dT1 + 2) (16)
IfdT1 ' 0, then the right hand side of (16) is increasing in tf. Therefore, there existsaj such
that
i . 0 and —R EdT + t( B )dB] + cIT2  0 if t  tj * (1 7a)
> 0 and
—R[dT1 + t(Bj)dBj] + cIT2 > 0 if t > tj (17b)
8If z(cj 1 )/S(CJ2) is decreasing (increasing) in t ,then the weight [M(c1 1 )/z(cj2) ÷RJ 1
in the weighted sum (15) is increasing (decreasing) in t3 so that, from (1 7a,b) the positive
values of —R EdT1 + t'(B )dB3 I + cIT2 receive larger (smaller) weights and hence the value of dC1
in (15) is positive (negative). As an example, consider the isoelestic utility function u(c) =
c6/( 1—a) for a>0. In this case, z(Cj1 )/(cJ2) = 2' 1 Itfollowsfrom the first—order
condition (4) that Cj 2 i = [13R( I —tj)J 1 ,' so that Cj 1 )/z( Cj2) = [13R( I
—t1)]
1 / is a
decreasing function of t'. Therefore, an increase in T leads to en increase in aggregate
first—period consumption. This result contradicts both the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem and the
prediction from a straightforward application of a "Keynesian" consumption function.
V. Extensions to Progressive Wealth and Capital Income Taxes
The literature on the effects of changes in lump—sum tax and transfer policy has focussed on the
role of, and motivation for, voluntary private intergenerational transfers. The reason for this
focus can be traced to Diamonds (1965) seminal paper with finitely—lived consumers who do not
leave bequests. The Diamond model provided a coherent general equilibrium framework with
maximizing firms and consumers in which lump—sum changes in the government's financial policy
have real effects. Subsequently, Barro( 1974) showed that if consumers have operative bequest
motives arising from intergenerational eltruism, then lump—sum changes in the goverment's
financial policy are irrelevant. Since the appearance of Berro's paper, the question of Ricardian
equivalence has revolved largely around the role of intergenerational transfers.3 It is in keeping
with the spirit of this literature that I interpreted the model presented above in terms of a
nonlinear tax on bequests. However, it is not the tax on bequests pr which leads to the effects of
intertemporally balanced—budget changes in lump—sum taxes. The model presented above could
alternatively be interpreted as applying to an economy in which all consumers live for two periods
and leave no bequests. In this case, the tax t( B) is to be interpreted as a tax on wealth or saving.
If we interpret the model presented above as applying to consumers who live for two periods,
9then it may be more relevant to interpret the results asapplying to an economy with a nonlinear
property income tax rather than a wealth tax, In this case, the variable B would beinterpreted as
saving at the end of the first period, and (R— 1 )B is property income. Letting t*( ( R— 1 )B) be the
property income tax, the first—order condition (4) must be amended to
u(c1) = 13[R_(R_1)t*ity(c2) (18)
Logarithmically differentiating (18) with respect toc1 , c2, and B yields
= z(c2)dc2 + 0(B)dB (19a)
where 0(B) = [(R_1)2t*"J/[fl_(R_,)t*.] (19b)
Using (9) to eliminate dc2 and (7) to eliminate dB, we obtain4
{z(c1) + Rz(c2) ÷ 0(B)) dc1 = — 0(B)dT1 (20)
Recalling that 0  t < 1 and that t" 0, it follows from (1 9b) that 0(B) 0 with strict
inequality if t > 0. Therefore, (20) implies that —1 < dc1 /dT1  0, with strict inequality
if t'" > 0. Thus, for an economy with a representativeconsumer, the effects of lump—sum tax
changes in the presence of a nonlinear property income tax are qualitatively thesame as the effects
in the presence of a nonlinear estate tax as thrived in section III.
Vi. Labor Income Taxes
It is well—known that changes in the structure ofdistortionary (non—lump—sum) taxes will
affect the allocation of consumption. For example, Carmichael (1982) and Burbidge (1983) have
each shown that if labor supply is a choice variable of individualconsumers, then changes in the tax
rate on labor income affect the allocation of consumption and output. Theimplication drawn by
Burbidge (1983) is that government "debt is not neutr8l once one permits a labor—leisure choice
to the young who pay taxes on their earnings." (p.226) However, if tax revenue is raised by both
lump sum taxes and labor income taxes, then Burbidge's result must be modified: If thegovernment
finances a current tax cut by issuing bonds, then government debt will beneutral if the labor
income tax schedule is unchanged. That is, changes in the timing of lump sum taxes have no effect
on the allocation of consumption if the only other tax is a labor income tax. This result holds
10
whether the labor income tax is linear or nonlinear.
To establish the modification of Burbidges result, let L be the labor supply of an individual in
period i, and let w1 be the (exogenous) pre—tax real wage rate in period i so that w1L1 is labor
income in period i. Then, letting tL(WL) be the labor income tax, and assuming that the only other
tax is a head tax, we can modify equations (1) — (4) to write the maximization problem of a period
1 consumer as
maxu*(c1,L1) + 13u*(c27L2) (21)
s.t. c2 = R[e1 ÷w1L1 —tL(wlLl)—T1 —c1J +e2+w212—tL(w212)—T2
The first—order conditions are
— u*11/u*1 = [1—t'L(wlLi)]wj i = 1,2 (22a)
U*c = J3Ru*c2 (22b)
The government budget constraint is
Rh1 + tL(WJLI)] + T2 + t1(w2L2) = 0. (23)
If RdT 1 + dT2 = 0, then it is both feasible and optimal for consumers to maintain the initial
values of c1 and L. Because consumers continue to earn the same labor income and pay the same
labor income taxes, the government budget constraint will be satisfied.
The analysis in this section illustrates that Ricardian Equivalence is not necessarily destroyed
by the existence of (linear or nonlinear) labor income taxes if the government also has access to
lump sum taxes. This finding is to be contrasted with the results in previous sections in which the
existence of a nonlinear tax on wealth, saving, property income, inheritances or bequests leads to a
violation of Ricardian Equivalence. The difference in the results is due to the fact that Ricardian
Equivalence requires consumers to change their path of wealth accumulation to maintain unchanged
consumption in the face of a tax change. If there is a nonlinear tax on wealth or income accruing to
wealth, then changes in wealth accumulation will change intertemporal prices and render the
initial allocation of consumption suboptimal. However, changes in the pattern of wealth
accumulation have no effect on the price ofleisure implied by the labor income tax.
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VII. Conclusion
This paper has explored the implications of increasingmarginal tax rates on bequests,
inheritances, property income and wealth for the efficacy of lump—sum tax and transferpolicies.
We demonstrated that the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem fails to hold inthe presence of nonlinear
taxes on bequests, inheritances, property income or wealth. It isimportant to note that the
breakdown of Ricardian Equivalence results from the nonlinearity in the estate tax; with a constant
marginal tax rate, Ricardian Equivalence is preserved under the standard set ofassumptions. There
are two channels by which Jump—sum tax and transfer policies are effective in thepresence of a
nonlinear tax. First, the marginal tax rate canvary for an individual as his wealth varies. Second,
the marginal tax rate can very cross—sectionally across consumers with different levels of wealth.
In an economy with identical consumers, the only source of variation in themarginal estate tax
rate is variation in the wealth of the representative consumer. If the RicardianEquivalence
Theorem were to hold in such an economy, then a lump—sum tax increase would reduce
contemporaneous savings as consumers maintained an unchanged allocation ofconsumption over
time. However, the reduction in savings implies a reduction in the consumer's estate and hence a
reduction in the marginal estate tax rate. This reduction in the marginal estate tax rate reduces the
pric#f the consumer s hew s.consumption relative tothe price of the consumer sown
consumption. Thus, the consumer isinducd to increase his bequest at the expensive ofreducing his
own consumption. This result is qualitatively the same as predicted by asimple Keynesian
consumption fucntion relating consumption to contemporaneous disposable income.
The cross—sectional variation in marginal estate tax rates which arises fromcross—sectional
variation in wealth implies that changes in the timing of lump—sum taxes will induce
redistributicins of resources across families with different marginal estate tax rates. In
particular, an increase in the current lump—sum tax will fall more heavily on families with low
marginal tax rates than on families with high marginal tax rates. This redistribution of resources
will undoubtedly affect the cross—sectional allocation of consumption. Whether aggregate
12
consumption is affected by a contemporaneous change in the lump—sum tax depends on the utility
functions of consumers. If the instantaneous utility function displays constant absolute risk
aversion, and if the tax change issrnall enough so that all consumers remain in their initial estate
tax brackets, then aggregate consumption is unaffected by the lump-sum tax change. However, this
finding should not be viewed as a vindication of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem, because the zero
change in aggregate consumption masks changes in the consumption of individual consumers. More
generally, aggregate consumption as well as the cross—sectional allocation of consumption will
change in response to a change in lump—sum taxes.
As explained in section V, the historical development of the literature has led to a strong link
between Ricardian Equivalence and the existence of bequests motivated by intergenerational
altruism. We have shown that the presence of a nonlinear tax on bequests destrs the Ricardian
Equivalence Theorem. Moreover, it is not the nonlinear tax on bequests ,oer. which is
important; Ricardian Equivalence will fail to hold whenever there is a nonlinear tax on saving or
the income accruing to saving. The key question is whether a change in the timing of lump—sum
taxes leads to an optimal intertemporal reallocation of consumption within the consumer's family.
If thera.is such.an optimal reallocation, then Ricardian Equivalence is violated regardless of
whether the reallocation is across different generations of the family or across different periods of
a consumers life.
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Footnotes
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1. It is possible in an infinite—horizon modal for the government to reduce current taxes
without having to increase future taxes at any date if the interest rate is smaller than the
population growth rate. (See Barro( 1976), Feldstein( 1976) and Carmicheel( 1982)). This
consideration does not arise in the two—period economy in this paper.
2. We have assumed that all consumers know the government budget constraint and correctly
anticipate the second—period tax 12. However, we assume that individual consumers behave
atom istically: in choosing B, individual consumers take Ti and 12 as parametrically given since
no consumer is large enough to affect per capita revenues by his actions alone. If there were
only one consumer in the economy, then his behavior would affect T and 12. In this case,
substituting the government budget constraint (5) into the consumers budget constraint (from
(2) and (3)) would yield c2 = R(e1 — c1) +82, and Ricardian Equivalence would hold in this
case with a single consumer.
Alternatively, the Ricerdian Equivalence Theorem would hold in the presence of lump—sum
taxes if all families were effectively linked to one another by operative intergenerational
transfers. Bernheim and Bagwell (1984) have argued that such linkages will be important
because people from different families merry and have children. However, if one takes the
Bernheim—Begwell results seriously, then not only are lump—sum taxes irrelevant, but the
price system is also irrelevant. The implication which Bernheim and Bagwell draw from these
overly strong results is that bequests must be generated by motives other than (possibly in
addition to) altruism.
3. Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1984) isan interesting exception.
4. Equation (9) h0ds under a property income tax as well as under an estate tax. With a
property income tax, the budget constraint of en individual consumer implies
— ((4.1)
Thegovernmentbudgetconstraintjs RI1 + t*((R_I)B) + 12 = Owhichcanbetotelly
differentiated with respect to T , 12 and B to yield
RdT1 + (R_1)t*dB + JT2 = 0. ((4.2)
combining equations (f4. 1) end ((4.2) and using (7) yields (9).
